Public health scientist working inside a maximum-containment virology laboratory

Global Health Systems Face New Challenges From Emerging Infectious Diseases

Emerging infectious diseases are testing the resilience of health systems around the world. New pathogens, familiar infections returning to new places, antimicrobial resistance and pressure on public-health budgets are exposing gaps in surveillance, laboratories, staffing and access to medical countermeasures. The central challenge is no longer simply how to respond after an outbreak is declared. It is whether countries can detect unusual signals early, share reliable information quickly and protect communities before local transmission becomes an international emergency.

Frontline healthcare workers training to identify and care for suspected Ebola patients
Frontline healthcare workers in Guinea practise identifying, isolating and caring for suspected Ebola patients. Image: Wikimedia Commons; consult the file page for creator and reuse terms. Image source and licensing

Why emerging infections remain a global concern

Emerging infectious diseases include infections that are newly identified in people as well as known diseases that spread into new geographic areas or reappear after periods of decline. Their origins and routes of transmission vary. Some are zoonotic, passing between animals and humans; others spread through contaminated food or water, vectors such as mosquitoes and ticks, or person-to-person contact. International travel, trade, urban growth, changing land use and environmental disruption can create more opportunities for pathogens to move between populations.

The World Health Organization (WHO) says more than 60% of emerging infectious diseases reported globally originate in animals, whether wildlife or domestic species. That figure reinforces why public-health planning cannot stop at hospital walls. Veterinary services, environmental agencies, farmers, wildlife specialists and local communities all contribute to understanding risks before a spillover event becomes a human outbreak. The One Health approach brings these disciplines together rather than treating human, animal and ecosystem health as separate problems.

Recent experience with Ebola and Marburg has also shown that outbreaks do not all follow the same pattern. A virus may remain geographically contained when local teams can rapidly identify cases, trace contacts, communicate clearly and deliver protective care. But conflict, displacement, distrust, weak transport networks and limited laboratory access can make those measures much harder to sustain. The same pathogen can therefore pose very different risks depending on the strength and reach of the health system around it.

Detection is the first line of defence

Speed matters. A cluster of unexplained fever, unusual respiratory illness or unexpected deaths may be the first indication of a new threat. Effective surveillance connects clinics, hospitals, laboratories and community reporting systems so that unusual patterns are investigated instead of disappearing into fragmented records. In emergencies, surveillance also needs to function in places affected by conflict, natural disasters or mass displacement, where routine health services may be disrupted.

WHO describes public-health surveillance as the continuous and systematic collection, analysis and interpretation of health-related data. The information is useful only when it leads to action: an alert must reach the right authority, samples must be tested, and response teams must be able to investigate. Digital reporting tools can reduce delays, but technology cannot compensate for clinics without staff, reliable electricity, transport or basic diagnostic supplies.

In October 2026, WHO outlined a 2026–2030 strategy for its Hub for Pandemic and Epidemic Intelligence. The strategy brings together more than 160 Member States and 190 partner organizations and networks, with an ambition to detect and understand new health threats within 24 hours of their emergence. Its priorities include stronger surveillance, faster detection through innovation, better use of analytics and trusted digital foundations. The ambition is significant, but its success depends on countries being able to contribute timely, high-quality information and act on what the data reveal.

Scientists examining genetic information during DNA sequencing research
Scientists examine genetic information during DNA sequencing research. Image: National Cancer Institute / Wikimedia Commons (public domain)

Genomic sequencing can reveal how pathogens spread

Laboratory capacity is a critical part of early warning. Traditional diagnostic tests can establish whether a patient is infected with a known pathogen. Genomic sequencing can go further by helping scientists identify mutations, compare samples and investigate whether cases may be linked. When sequencing is connected to epidemiological information, it can help public-health teams understand transmission chains and monitor changes that could affect diagnostics, vaccines or treatments.

WHO reported in February 2026 that more than 110 countries had strengthened genomic surveillance through the International Pathogen Surveillance Network. The same update described an expanded Epidemic Intelligence from Open Sources system, using artificial intelligence to support more than 110 countries in identifying and reacting to potential threats. These developments show how shared systems can improve situational awareness. They do not remove the need for trained epidemiologists, laboratory quality controls, transparent data governance and sustained funding.

There are also important equity questions. If sequencing and advanced diagnostics are concentrated in a small number of wealthy countries, outbreaks elsewhere may be recognized later and local researchers may have less influence over the evidence used to guide global decisions. Building regional laboratory networks, training local scientists and ensuring fair access to technology are therefore not optional extras. They are part of a credible global security system.

Hospitals need capacity before the emergency

Hospitals often become the visible front line of an outbreak, but preparedness must be built long before patient numbers rise. Facilities need clear triage procedures, infection-prevention protocols, adequate protective equipment, trained staff, safe isolation areas and reliable supplies of oxygen, medicines and diagnostic tests. Workers also need practical training and psychological support. A protocol that exists only on paper will not protect staff when a busy emergency department is under pressure.

Outbreaks can also weaken health services beyond the disease itself. When clinics redirect staff and beds to an emergency, routine vaccination, maternal care, tuberculosis treatment and chronic-disease services may be interrupted. Patients may avoid facilities because they fear infection. The result can be preventable illness and deaths unrelated to the outbreak pathogen. Resilient systems therefore need surge capacity and continuity plans that protect essential services while emergency teams respond.

Healthcare workers practising protective equipment procedures for an Ebola response

Antimicrobial resistance makes infections harder to treat

Another pressure is antimicrobial resistance (AMR), which occurs when bacteria, viruses, fungi or parasites no longer respond reliably to medicines. Resistant infections can make routine treatment more complicated, increase hospital stays and raise the risk that common procedures become more dangerous. AMR is not identical to a newly emerging virus, but it changes the landscape in which infectious diseases are diagnosed and treated.

WHO’s July 2026 fact sheet reported that approximately one in six laboratory-confirmed bacterial infections worldwide in 2023 were resistant to antibiotics. It also noted that resistance had increased in more than 40% of monitored pathogen–antibiotic combinations between 2018 and 2023. Misuse and overuse of antimicrobials, inadequate infection prevention, gaps in vaccination and poor access to appropriate diagnostics all contribute to the problem.

In May 2026, the World Health Assembly adopted an updated Global Action Plan on Antimicrobial Resistance for 2026–2036. The framework promotes a One Health response spanning human health, animals, food systems and the environment. For health systems, that means improving infection prevention, laboratory surveillance, responsible prescribing and access to effective medicines while reducing unnecessary antimicrobial use. It also means investing in research and development so that new treatments and diagnostics can reach patients who need them.

New tools must be matched by trust and fair access

Artificial intelligence, digital disease reporting and genomic analysis can help identify patterns that might otherwise be missed. Yet these tools create value only when data are accurate, systems are secure and decisions remain accountable. Poor-quality data can produce false alarms or conceal a real signal. Privacy safeguards matter because health information is sensitive, and communities may stop cooperating if surveillance is perceived as intrusive or discriminatory.

Public trust is equally important during an outbreak. Authorities need to explain what is known, what remains uncertain and why guidance may change as evidence develops. Communication should be available in accessible languages and formats, and it should work through trusted local health workers as well as national channels. Rumours and misinformation can undermine vaccination, delay care-seeking and make contact tracing harder. Listening to communities is therefore a practical public-health measure, not merely a public-relations exercise.

Fair access to vaccines, tests and treatments is another test of preparedness. The COVID-19 pandemic showed how competition for scarce supplies can leave lower-income countries waiting while wealthier buyers secure early deliveries. WHO’s February 2026 update noted that Member States had adopted the WHO Pandemic Agreement in May 2025 and were continuing work on its pathogen access and benefit-sharing arrangements. The goal is to connect rapid sharing of pathogen materials and information with more equitable access to products developed from them. The details of implementation will matter as much as the political commitment.

Hospital staff receiving infection prevention and control training
Hospital staff receive infection-control training. Image: CDC Global / Wikimedia Commons (CC BY 2.0). Image source and licensing

Financing and coordination remain the difficult parts

Preparedness is often treated as an expense that can be reduced when there is no visible emergency. That is a short-term calculation. Surveillance networks, trained staff, stockpiles, laboratories and local response teams require continuous investment, even during quiet periods. If these capabilities are allowed to deteriorate, governments may face much larger costs when an outbreak spreads and trade, education and routine health services are disrupted.

WHO reported in February 2026 that the Pandemic Fund had provided more than US$1.2 billion in grants across its first three rounds, helping catalyse additional financing for projects in 98 countries. The funding has supported surveillance, laboratory networks, workforce training and coordination. Such investments are important, but grants alone cannot guarantee long-term resilience. National budgets, regional cooperation and predictable international financing all have a role.

Coordination is another persistent obstacle. Outbreak response involves health ministries, local governments, hospitals, laboratories, border authorities, animal-health agencies, humanitarian organizations and research institutions. Without clear responsibilities and trusted channels for sharing information, valuable time can be lost. Joint exercises and transparent reporting can expose weaknesses before a real emergency does.

What stronger global health systems should prioritize

First, countries should strengthen primary care and community-based surveillance, because unusual illness is often noticed locally before it appears in national statistics. Second, they should invest in regional laboratory capacity, specimen transport and genomic sequencing, with training and quality assurance. Third, hospitals need reliable infection-prevention systems, protective equipment and staffing plans that can expand during surges without abandoning essential services.

Fourth, governments should embed One Health collaboration in routine planning, connecting human, animal and environmental monitoring. Fifth, they should support responsible antimicrobial use and expand access to vaccines, diagnostics and effective treatments. Finally, international institutions should make cooperation practical through rapid information-sharing, clear accountability and fair access to the medical tools that follow from research.

The next outbreak will test systems, not just science

Scientific innovation is improving the world’s ability to identify pathogens and develop countermeasures. But a fast diagnostic test cannot help if samples cannot reach a laboratory; a vaccine cannot stop transmission if communities cannot access it; and an alert cannot trigger action if agencies do not trust one another. Preparedness is a chain, and weaknesses in any link can undermine the whole response.

The progress recorded since COVID-19 is real, from stronger genomic networks to new international frameworks and expanded epidemic intelligence. It is also uneven and vulnerable to funding shifts, conflict and political fragmentation. Emerging infectious diseases will continue to challenge health systems, but their consequences are not predetermined. Countries that invest in local capacity, share information responsibly and cooperate across borders will be better placed to contain outbreaks early and protect essential care. The most effective response to the next epidemic begins well before the first emergency declaration.

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